Siam News

Author: Hitoshi Tanaka, JCIE Strains in Japan–ROK relations, which seriously deteriorated after former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s Takeshima visit stirred tensions and reopened historical wounds, present a challenge not just for the bilateral relationship but also to regional stability. Both countries’ new leaders — South Korean President Park Geun-hye and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo [...]

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Author: Sajjad Ashraf, NUS In a parallel development with the rise of Asia, bilateral relations between the region’s two largest countries, China and India, have improved remarkably since the late 1980s. Trade volume, which was about US$3 billion at the turn of the century, has soared to US$80 billion, making China India’s largest trading partner [...]

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Authors: Djisman S. Simandjuntak, Indonesia, and Lee Sun-Jin, South Korea Recently, sales of Korean-made cars have surged in China while Japanese-made cars have sharply reduced. Korea and Japan agreed in October not to extend their currency swap agreements when they expire at the end of the month. These new developments may be attributed to the [...]

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Taxis in Bangkok and nearby provinces will have better hygiene standards in preparation for the arrival of the ASEAN Community in less than three years’ time. See the original post here: Clean up time for Bangkok Taxis Sectors linked to external demand (namely, manufacturing, hotels and transport) have been the main contributors to growth since [...]

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Author: Hai Hong Nguyen, UQ ASEAN will be celebrating 45 years of operations next month, yet the event has been overshadowed by the organisation’s recent failure to pass a joint communiqué after its Phnom Penh Ministerial Meeting. This political and diplomatic incident revealed a deep crack in ASEAN, and the challenge now is how to [...]

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In a first, ASEAN foreign ministers have failed to issue a summary statement of their deliberations.

The point of contention was the South China Sea. “In Beijing’s view, ASEAN has no business trying to resolve the disputes over the South China Sea, which can only be settled bilaterally between China and each of the four Southeast Asian claimants,” writes Southeast Asia scholar Donald Emmerson for Asia Times. He questions whether the divide may damage ASEAN’s ability “to sponsor a binding code governing state behavior in the South China Sea.” Discussions between China and ASEAN on a draft code are scheduled for September.

The drafting of the code embodies the ongoing power struggle over Chinese claims. Observers are on alert for any delays or changes brought under Chinese pressure. “Throwing its weight around in the South China Sea may well keep lesser states at bay, but it will confirm China’s image as a bully,” Emmerson concludes. “Beijing feels entitled to the South China Sea, and that sense of entitlement limits its ability to project soft power.” China could be better off with a multilateral process rather than a series of bilateral fights with ASEAN members. – YaleGlobal China’s claims to South China Sea divide ASEAN members, who fail to issue a consensus statement Donald K. EmmersonAsia Times Online, 19 July 2012Donald K Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Forum at Stanford University. His latest publication is “Southeast Asia: Minding the Gap between Democracy and Governance,” Journal of Democracy (April 2012).

Rights:© Copyright1999-2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings), Ltd.

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Carlyle A.

ThayerCANBERRA: The term “rocky relations” took on new meaning after Chinese civilian maritime enforcement ships confronted a Philippines Navy frigate in a standoff over a disputed shoal in the South China Sea.

The Scarborough Shoal is marked by five rocks, the tallest of which projects 3 meters above water at high tide.

The surrounding fishing grounds and, more importantly, the legal principles determining ownership and right of exploitation are at issue.   How the dispute is resolved holds broader implications for the region wary of a rising China. South China Sea islands and reefs have been a bone of contention between China and its neighbors for decades. Scarborough Shoal – a triangular-shaped chain of reefs and rocks, enclosing an area of 150 square kilometers – emerged as a new flashpoint in April.

The shoal, approximately 200 kilometers west of Subic Bay, is north of the Spratly Islands, contested between China and Vietnam.

The standoff began 8 April when a Philippine reconnaissance aircraft spotted five Chinese fishing vessels in the lagoon.

The Philippine Navy dispatched a frigate to investigate the Chinese vessels and two days later discovered giant clams, coral and sharks, species protected under Philippines law and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna.

Two China Marine Surveillance ships soon arrived, interposing themselves between the frigate and the fishing vessels. China and the Philippines formally protested the other’s actions. Both China and the Philippines claim that Scarborough Shoal is an integral part of their national territory. In an effort to lower tensions, the Philippines withdrew the navy frigate, replacing it with a Coast Guard cutter.

The cutter was joined by a Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessel. China reinforced its presence by dispatching its newest Fishery Law Enforcement Command ship, Yuzheng 310.

The standoff continues today. Both China and the Philippines claim that Scarborough Shoal is an integral part of their national territory. China refers to Scarborough Shoal as Huangyan Island, claiming “indisputable sovereignty” over the island and adjacent waters on the basis of historical discovery. Under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, an island is defined as a naturally formed feature that can support human habitation or has an economic function, and entitled to a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ. If a feature does not meet these criteria, it’s classified as a rock, entitled to 12 nautical-miles of territorial waters, but not an exclusive economic zone. China’s claim relates to sovereignty over territory and sovereign rights in waters generated from this territory. If Scarborough Shoal met the legal requirement for an island, it would generate the 200-nautical-mile zone. Failing to meet this requirement, each of the five rocks would be entitled to 12 nautical-miles of territorial waters The Philippines refers to Scarborough Shoal as Panatag Shoal, arguing that if falls within its 200- nautical-mile EEZ.

The claim rests on sovereign rights to the resources within the EEZ and continental shelf. UNCLOS lacks authority to decide on sovereignty disputes over land features such as islands and rocks.

The law applies only in cases of disputes arising from maritime jurisdiction. China and the Philippines could resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations or could agree to arbitration by an international tribunal such as the International Court of Justice. China argues that the dispute should be settled bilaterally; the Philippines wants the dispute to go before the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea, established by UNCLOS. Both sides use political posturing to accompany bilateral diplomacy to advance their claims.

The Philippines has adopted a three-pronged strategy – legal, political and diplomatic – threatening to take the dispute unilaterally to the international tribunal; seeking support from fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the international community; and continuing negotiations with China. China resorts to a variety of measures to pressure the Philippines: Responding to minor anti-China protests in Manila and elsewhere around the world, China issued a travel advisory leading to cancellation of 80 scheduled Chinese tour groups and charter flights to the Philippines; temporarily halted imports of Filipino bananas on a pretext of infestation; and orchestrated a hostile press campaign. In 2011 the Philippines exported $60 million worth of bananas to China, its third largest banana export market. Losses of banana exports in May were estimated at around $34 million. China is the source of the fourth largest number of tourists to the Philippines.

The average Chinese tourist stays for three days, spending $200 per day. In May, 1,500 Chinese tourists cancelled visits to the Philippines resulting in a loss of nearly $1 million to the tourist industry. China also announced imposition of a unilateral fishing ban in the South China Sea covering the area that includes the shoal, warning that action would be taken against foreign fishing vessels that violate the ban, with the ostensible purpose of protecting fishing stocks during the spawning season.

The Philippines countered by refusing to recognize the validity of the Chinese ban, but issued its own fishing ban covering the shoal. Many observers viewed the reciprocal fishing bans as a positive sign, offering a way to deescalate tensions.

These expectations were short lived. In late May China dispatched three additional civilian enforcement vessels to Scarborough Shoal accompanied by 10 Chinese fishing boats according to Philippine sources. China admitted that 20 fishing boats were at the shoal.

The Philippines claimed that, when dinghies operating from the fishing boats were added up, China had nearly 100 vessels at the shoal. Chinese civilian authorities took no steps to prevent these craft from fishing while China’s ban remained in force. UNCLOS lacks authority to decide on sovereignty disputes over land features such as islands and rocks. Security implications of the standoff could not be missed. In the midst of the standoff, the Philippines and the United States conducted their annual Balikatan military exercise. One phase involved Filipino and US forces conducting counterterrorism raids on an oilrig in waters off the west coast of Palawan Island facing the South China Sea. China charged that US support for the Philippines only emboldened Manila to act rashly and called on the US to rein in its ally.

To underscore its determination in pursuing area claims, China announced in May that its first locally produced deep water mega oil-drilling rig would commence operations in the South China Sea, leading to protests in the Philippines. In fact, the oil rig is off the mouth of the Pearl River, south of Hong Kong, well within China’s EEZ, where it will likely remain for years.

The Philippines may have overplayed its hand with misguided expectations of receiving support from fellow ASEAN members and its US alliance. Some ASEAN members and even Filipino activists have expressed misgivings about how Manila confronted Beijing. In the words of one Filipino senator, the Philippines found itself an orphan. Both sides stumbled into this confrontation, taking immediate actions that precluded quick diplomatic resolution. Subsequent posturing only served to entrench antagonistic positions, fueling domestic nationalism on both sides.

The United States must calibrate its response and avoid getting dragged into a territorial dispute with China not of its own making. At the same time, the US must prevent its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines from being devalued through lack of perceived support for an ally. China’s actions – refusing to make diplomatic concessions, deploying civilian enforcement ships and using economic sanctions – serve as an object lesson to other regional states about potential costs of confronting China over territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

The standoff also reminds Washington about the need for careful diplomacy that reassures allies without entangling itself in a distant conflict. 

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In Malaysia, recent opinion polls indicate Prime Minister Najib Razak’s approval rating is rising after a series of political victories.  The prime minister’s political fortunes are fueling speculation he will soon call an early election. With Najib’s approval rating at an all time high of 69 percent, this week his government formally abandoned the dreaded [...]

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